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Abstract. In this paper, following an idea of Christophe Chalons, I propose a new kind of
forcing axiom, the Maximality Principle, which asserts that any sentence ϕ holding in some
forcing extension V P and all subsequent extensions V P∗Q˙ holds already in V . It follows, in fact,
that such sentences must also hold in all forcing extensions of V . In modal terms, therefore,
the Maximality Principle is expressed by the scheme (✸ ϕ) =⇒ ϕ, and is equivalent
to the modal theory S5. In this article, I prove that the Maximality Principle is relatively
consistent with zfc. A boldface version of the Maximality Principle, obtained by allowing real
parameters to appear in ϕ, is equiconsistent with the scheme asserting that Vδ ≺ V for an
inaccessible cardinal δ, which in turn is equiconsistent with the scheme asserting that ord is
Mahlo. The strongest principle along these lines is mp∼ , which asserts that mp∼ holds in V and
all forcing extensions. From this, it follows that 0# exists, that x# exists for every set x, that
projective truth is invariant by forcing, that Woodin cardinals are consistent and much more.
Many open questions remain.
1 The Maximality Principle
Christophe Chalons has introduced a delightful new axiom, asserting in plain language that
anything that is forceable and not subsequently unforceable is true. Specifically, in [2] he
proposes the following principle:
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The Chalons Maximality Principle Suppose ϕ is a sentence and for every inaccessible
cardinal κ there is a forcing notion P ∈ Vκ such that V
P
κ |= ϕ and for any such P and any
further forcing Q˙ it holds that V P∗Q˙κ |= ϕ, then there are unboundedly many inaccessible
cardinals κ with Vκ |= ϕ.
In this paper, I would like to present a more streamlined version of Chalons’ axiom, along
with an equiconsistency analysis of the principle in various forms. My intention with these
streamlined axioms, which I call the Maximality Principles, is to take the essence of Chalons’
idea to heart, and accord more closely with the plain language slogan, “anything forceable
and not subsequently unforceable is true.”
So let me begin. Define that a sentence ϕ is possible or forceable when it holds in some
forcing extension V P. The sentence ϕ is necessary when it holds in all forcing extensions V P
(by trivial forcing, this includes V ). Thus, ϕ is forceably necessary (or possibly necessary)
when ϕ holds in some forcing extension V P and all subsequent extensions V P∗Q˙, i.e. when it
is forceable that ϕ is necessary.
The forceably necessary sentences are therefore those which can be turned ‘on’ in a
permanent way, so that no further forcing can ever turn them off. Perhaps the simplest
example of a forceably necessary sentence is V 6= L, since this is easy to force, and once
it is forced, one cannot force its negation. More interesting examples include the assertion
“there is a real with minimal constructibility degree over L ,” which can be forced via Sacks
forcing—and once true, this assertion persists to any forcing extension—and the assertion
“there are a proper class of inaccessible cardinals, if any,” which I consider in Theorem 8
below. Conversely, the sentences ch or ¬ch are forceable but never necessary because they
can be forced true or false over any model of set theory. The principle I have in mind, or at
least the first approximation to it, is the following:
Maximality Principle2 (mp) Any statement in the language of set theory that is forceably
necessary is true.
Here, I intend to assert mp as a scheme, the scheme that asserts of every statement ϕ in the
language of set theory that
if ϕ is forceably necessary, then ϕ.
I mean, of course, that ϕ is true in V . But it actually follows from this scheme that ϕ must
2Chalons [3] considers another principle approaching this, a scheme that asserts that if a statement ϕ
has the feature that for every inaccessible cardinal κ there is a poset P ∈ Vκ with V
P
κ |= ϕ and for every
such P and any further forcing Q˙ ∈ Vκ we have V
P∗Q˙
κ |= ϕ, then ϕ holds (in V ). Using this scheme as an
intermediary, Chalons establishes the consistency of the Chalons Maximality Principle by first establishing
the consistency of it, assuming the existence of a measurable cardinal. The ideas of the proof of Theorem 5
in this paper show that one can get away with less; indeed, to obtain the consistency of Chalons’ principle a
Mahlo cardinal is more than sufficient, and actually it suffices to have Vδ ≺ V for an inaccessible cardinal δ.
Apart from this question, though, I prefer to untie the core idea of the expression everything forceable and
not unforceable is true from the question of whether the statements are true in or forceable over every Vκ,
and this seems to lead to the more direct principle I have stated here.
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also be true in every forcing extension of V , that is, that ϕ is necessary; this is proved below
in Theorem 1.
By Tarski’s theorem on the non-definability of truth, there is in general no first order
way to express whether a statement is forceable or true; and so there seems to be little hope
of expressing the Maximality Principle scheme in a single first-order sentence of set theory.
Thus, I remain content with the Maximality Principle expressed as a scheme.
As I hope my terminology suggests, the Maximality Principle admits a particularly nat-
ural expression in modal logic. Specifically, if we take ✸ϕ to mean that ϕ is possible, that
is, that ϕ is forceable, that it holds in some forcing extension, and ϕ to mean that ϕ is
necessary, that is, that ϕ holds in all forcing extensions, then we have a very natural Kripke
frame interpretation of modal logic in which the possible worlds are simply the models of
zfc and one world is accessible from another if it is a forcing extension of that world.3
In this Kripke frame, one can easily check many elementary modal facts. The assertion
¬✸ϕ ⇐⇒ ¬ϕ, for example, expresses the trivial fact that ϕ is not forceable if and only
if ¬ϕ holds in all forcing extensions; furthermore, its validity provides a duality between ✸
and . The assertion (ϕ =⇒ ψ) =⇒ ( ϕ =⇒ ψ) is similarly easy to verify in this
context. Further, since every model of set theory is a (trivial) forcing extension of itself, we
can conclude ϕ =⇒ ✸ϕ, asserting that any true statement is forceable (by trivial forcing),
as well as the dual version ϕ =⇒ ϕ, asserting that any necessary statement is true. Using
the fact that a forcing extension of a forcing extension is a forcing extension of the ground
model, we can verify ✸✸ϕ =⇒ ✸ϕ, asserting that any statement forceable over a forcing
extension is forceable over the ground model, and the dual version ϕ =⇒ ϕ, asserting
that if a statement holds in all forcing extensions, then this remains true in any forcing
extension.
The axioms mentioned in the previous paragraph are exactly the axioms constituting the
modal theory known as S4 (see, for example, [6]). And since the modal operators ✸ and ,
as I have defined them in this article, are expressible in the language of set theory, we can
view these S4 axioms as simple theorems of zfc.
In this modal terminology, the assertion that ϕ is forceably necessary is exactly expressed
by the assertion ✸ ϕ. The Maximality Principle mp, therefore, asserts of every ϕ that
(✸ ϕ) =⇒ ϕ.
This way of stating the axiom naturally leads one to the apparently stronger principle, known
as the Euclidean Axiom in modal logic:
(✸ ϕ) =⇒ ϕ.
3A Kripke frame allows one to provide semantics for a modal theory. It consists of a collection of worlds
and an accessibility relation between the worlds. In such a frame, an assertion is possible in a world if it
is true in a world accessible by that world; the assertion is necessary in a world if it is true in all worlds
accessible by that world. The accessibility relation of this article, the one relating any model of set theory
with its forcing extensions, is both reflexive and transitive. Thus, it is what is known as an S4 frame.
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As a scheme, however, this apparently stronger principle is in fact no stronger than the
original principle, a fact I alluded to earlier. In fact, the Maximality Principle can be stated
in a variety of equivalent forms:
Equivalent Forms Theorem 1 The following schemes are equivalent, where ϕ ranges over
all sentences in the language of set theory:
1. Every forceably necessary statement is true: ✸ ϕ =⇒ ϕ.
2. Every forceably necessary statement is necessary: ✸ ϕ =⇒ ϕ.
3. Every forceable statement is necessarily forceable (i.e. forceable over every forcing
extension): ✸ϕ =⇒ ✸ϕ.
4. Every true statement is necessarily forceable: ϕ =⇒ ✸ϕ.
5. Every non-necessary statement is necessarily non-necessary: ¬ ϕ =⇒ ¬ ϕ.
Proof: This is an elementary exercise in modal reasoning. Scheme 2 is actually a special
case of scheme 1, obtained by replacing ϕ with ϕ in 1 to obtain ✸ ϕ =⇒ ϕ. This is
just ✸ ϕ =⇒ ϕ because ϕ is equivalent to ϕ. Conversely, scheme 2 implies scheme
1 because ϕ implies ϕ. Scheme 3 is the contrapositive form of scheme 2 (with ¬ϕ replacing
ϕ) and vice versa, because ¬✸ ¬ϕ is equivalent to ✸ϕ and ¬ ¬ϕ is equivalent to ✸ϕ.
Scheme 4, similarly, is the contrapositive form of scheme 1. Finally, scheme 5 is obtained
from scheme 3 (applied to ¬ϕ) by pushing the negation through to ϕ, and conversely by
pulling it out again.
Schemes 2, 3 and 5 can be strengthened to the full equivalences
✸ ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ, ✸ϕ ⇐⇒ ✸ϕ and ¬ ϕ ⇐⇒ ¬ ϕ
because the converse implication in each case is immediate.
Because the various schemes are equivalent, let me now freely refer to any of them as
the Maximality Principle mp. In particular, in form 2 above the principle asserts that any
possibly necessary statement is necessary, and thus, under the Maximality Principle the
collection of statements holding necessarily is maximal.
Those readers familiar with modal logic will recognize Scheme 5 above, the axiom ¬ =⇒
¬ ϕ, as precisely the axiom one adds to S4 to make the modal theory S5 (see [6]).
Therefore, since we have already observed that the weaker S4 axioms hold automatically,
we can make the following conclusion:
Theorem 2 In the Kripke frame whose worlds are the models of zfc, each of which accesses
precisely its forcing extensions, the Maximality Principle mp in a world is equivalent to the
assertion of the S5 axioms of modal logic in that world.4
4Let me emphasize here that the Maximality Principle includes the assertions ✸ ϕ =⇒ ϕ only for
sentences ϕ. In particular, it would be wrong to include, as one might want in other contexts, the universal
generalizations of this axiom applied to formulas with free variables. Indeed, doing so would result in an
inconsistent theory, as I prove in Observation 3.
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One naturally wants to express the Maximality Principle in a language with parameters,
and so I will also consider the following boldface version of the Maximality Principle, which
allows for arbitrary parameters from R:
Maximality Principle, Boldface Version (mp∼ ) Any statement in the language of set
theory with arbitrary real parameters that is forceably necessary is necessary. That is,
(✸ ϕ) =⇒ ϕ.
This boldface version of the principle also admits the equivalent forms of Theorem 1. Sub-
suming the parameters into a universal quantifier, one can alternatively think of the boldface
Maximality Principle as the scheme asserting all sentences of the form
∀x ∈ R [✸ ϕ(x) =⇒ ϕ(x)],
where ϕ is a formula with one free variable x.
With real parameters, of course, one can in effect refer to any hereditarily countable set
as a parameter. And while one might want to include even more parameters than this, it
would be inadvisable to do so in view of the following:
Observation 3 If a set p is not hereditarily countable, then there is a statement ϕ(p) in the
language of set theory with parameter p which is forceably necessary, but not true. Hence,
the Maximality Principle asserted in the language of set theory with arbitrary parameters is
false.
Proof: Let ϕ(p) simply be the statement, “p is hereditarily countable.” Of course, this is
forceably necessary, since any set can be made countable by forcing, and once countable, it
can never be made uncountable again by further forcing. But by the hypothesis on p, the
statement ϕ(p) is not true.
Before introducing the next principle, let me observe the following.
Observation 4 The Maximality Principle mp, if true, is necessary. In modal terminology,
mp =⇒ mp.
Proof: If a sentence ϕ is forceably necessary over a forcing extension, then it was already
forceably necessary over the ground model, and if necessary in the ground model, it re-
mains necessary in any forcing extension. That is, ✸ϕ is downward absolute from a forcing
extension, and ϕ is upward absolute to any forcing extension. So mp =⇒ mp.
Observation 4 does not easily generalize to the boldface Maximality Principle mp∼ . The
problem is that there can be new real parameters in the forcing extension and thus entirely
new assertions ϕ there, which cannot be expressed in the ground model. This leads us to
the strongest principle I will consider in this article, the principle that asserts:
Necessary Maximality Principle ( mp∼ ) The principle mp∼ is necessary; that is, it holds
in V and every forcing extension V P.
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Let me caution the reader that one does not obtain the principle mp∼ merely by prefacing
every assertion in the mp∼ scheme with a , for this would only assert the scheme in a forcing
extension using parameters from the ground model; such assertions hold for free by mp∼ as in
Observation 4. Rather, mp∼ asserts that the full mp∼ scheme holds in every forcing extension
V P, using the additional real parameters available there.
Later, I will prove that the principle mp∼ is much stronger by far than the other Maximal-
ity Principles. If it holds, for example, then 0# exists and more, the universe is closed under
sharps and projective truth is invariant by set forcing. An upper bound on the consistency
strength of mp∼ is not yet known; it may simply be false.
2 Consistency of the Maximality Principle mp
Let us now analyze the consistency of the simplest of the Maximality Principles, namely, the
lightface version mp with no parameters.
Theorem 5 If zfc is consistent, then so also is zfc plus the Maximality Principle mp.
Proof: In order to highlight various aspects of the theory, I will actually give two proofs of
this theorem. The first proof is elementary, but the second proof will generalize to mp∼ . We
begin with a simple observation.
Lemma 5.1 For no sentence ϕ are both ϕ and ¬ϕ forceably necessary.
Proof: Suppose that ϕ is forced to be necessary by P, so that ϕ holds in every forcing
extension of V P, and that ¬ϕ is forced necessary by Q, so that ¬ϕ holds in every forcing
extension of V Q. Consider now the forcing P × Q. Since this is isomorphic to Q × P, the
extension V P×Q is a forcing extension both of V P and of V Q. Thus, both ϕ and ¬ϕ hold
there, a contradiction.
This argument generalizes to the following.5
Lemma 5.2 Over any model of set theory, the collection of forceably necessary statements
forms a consistent theory.
Proof: Consider any finite collection ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn of such sentences, each forceably nec-
essary over a fixed model M . Suppose that ϕi is forced necessary by Pi, and consider the
partial order P1× · · ·× Pn. The resulting forcing extension M
P1×···×Pn is a forcing extension
of each MPi , and so each ϕi holds there. Thus, any given finite collection of sentences force-
ably necessary over a fixed model of set theory is consistent. And so the whole collection is
consistent.
5Modal logicians will recognize that these lemmas rely on the directedness of the accessibility relation on
worlds. Specifically, the crucial fact at play here is that any two forcing extensions can be combined into a
third, which is a forcing extension of each of them.
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Lemma 5.3 If ϕ is forceably necessary, then this is necessary; and if ϕ is not forceably
necessary, then this also is necessary. In short, the collection of forceably necessary sentences
is invariant by forcing.
Proof: Suppose that ϕ is forced necessary by the forcing P, so that ϕ holds in every forcing
extension of V P. Given any other forcing extension V Q, one can still force with P to obtain
V Q×P. Since this is the same as V P×Q, it is a forcing extension of V P. Thus, over V Q
one could still force ϕ to be necessary; and so ϕ is forceably necessary in V Q, and hence
necessarily forceably necessary in V . Conversely, suppose that ϕ is not forceably necessary.
This means that ¬ϕ is forceable over every forcing extension. Thus, over no forcing extension
can ϕ be forced necessary, so ϕ is necessarily not forceably necessary. In summary, whether
a statement is forceably necessary or not cannot be affected by forcing.
To prove the theorem, now, suppose thatM is any model of zfc. Let T be the collection
of sentences that are forceably necessary inM . This includes every axiom of zfc, since these
axioms hold in every forcing extension of M . By Lemma 5.2, the theory T is consistent,
and so it has a model N . Suppose now that ϕ is forceably necessary over N ; I aim to show
that ϕ is true in N . First, I claim that ϕ is actually in T . If not, then it is not forceably
necessary in M , and so by Lemma 5.3 the sentence ¬✸ ϕ asserting that ϕ is not forceably
necessary is necessary and hence in T . In this case, since N is a model of T , the sentence
ϕ cannot be forceably necessary in N , contrary to our assumption. Thus, ϕ must be in T ,
and so it holds in N , as desired.
A Second Proof: I would like now to give an alternative proof of Theorem 5, relying on a
more traditional iterated forcing construction. It is this iterated forcing argument that will
generalize to the case of mp∼ .
Let me motivate the first lemma by mentioning that if there is an inaccessible cardinal
κ, then by the proof of the downward Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem, one can find a closed
unbounded set C ⊆ κ of cardinals δ with Vδ ≺ Vκ. The structure Vκ, therefore, is a model of
zfc with a cardinal δ such that Vδ is an elementary substructure of the universe. Axioma-
tizing this situation, let the expression “Vδ ≺ V ” represent the scheme, in the language with
an additional constant symbol for δ, which asserts of any statement ϕ in the language of set
theory that
for every x ∈ Vδ, if Vδ |= ϕ[x], then ϕ(x).
Each such assertion in this scheme is first order, since one need only refer to satisfaction in a
set structure, Vδ, and this is provided by Tarski’s definition of the satisfaction relation. The
little argument just given shows that if there is an inaccessible cardinal, then there is a model
of zfc satisfying the scheme Vδ ≺ V ; indeed, since the club C provides whole towers of such
δ, the consistency strength of Vδ ≺ V is easily seen to be strictly less than the consistency
of the existence of an inaccessible cardinal.
The really amazing thing, however, is that in fact zfc + Vδ ≺ V is equiconsistent with
zfc. One might incorrectly guess that if zfc holds in V and the scheme Vδ ≺ V holds, then
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V knows that Vδ is a model of zfc; but this conclusion would confuse the ‘external’ zfc
with the ‘internal’ zfc of the model. What follows is only that Vδ satisfies any particular
instance of an axiom of zfc but not the formula asserting that Vδ satisfies the entire scheme
zfc. This subtle distinction is crucial, in view of the following elementary fact.6
Lemma 5.4 If zfc is consistent, then so is zfc+ Vδ ≺ V .
Proof: Assume that zfc is consistent; so it has a model M . By the Le´vy Reflection
Theorem, every finite subcollection of the theory zfc + Vδ ≺ V is modeled in some rank
initial segment of M , and therefore is consistent. So the whole theory is consistent.
The theorem is now a consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5 Assume that Vδ ≺ V . Then there is a forcing extension of V , by forcing of
size at most δ, in which the Maximality Principle mp holds.
Proof: Since the Maximality Principle asserts, in a sense, that all possible switches have
been turned permanently on that are possible to turn permanently on, the idea behind the
proof of this lemma will be an iteration that forces all statements that are possible to force in
a permanent way. The trick is to handle the meta-mathematical issues that arise on account
of the non-definability of what is true or forceable. It is in doing this that the hypothesis
Vδ ≺ V will be used.
Let 〈ϕn | n ∈ ω 〉 enumerate all sentences in the language of set theory. I will define a
certain forcing notion P, an ω-iteration, all of whose initial segments Pn will be elements of
Vδ. So, suppose recursively that the iteration Pn has been defined up to stage n, and consider
the model V Pnδ . If ϕn is forceably necessary over this model, then choose a poset Qn which
forces it to be necessary, and let Pn+1 = Pn ∗ Q˙n using a suitable name for Qn. Let P be the
finite support iteration of the Pn.
I claim that if G ⊆ P is V -generic, then the Maximality Principle holds in V [G]. To
see this, suppose that ϕ is forceably necessary over V [G]. Necessarily, ϕ is ϕn for some n.
Factor the forcing P at stage n as P ∼= Pn ∗ Ptail, where Ptail is the iteration after stage n.
Since ϕ is forceably necessary over V [G] = V [Gn][Gtail], it is also forceably necessary over
V [Gn], because V [G] is a forcing extension of V [Gn] and so any forcing extension of V [G]
is also a forcing extension of V [Gn]. Since Vδ ≺ V and Pn ∈ Vδ, whether a condition in Pn
forces a given statement has the same answer in V as in Vδ. Consequently, Vδ[Gn] ≺ V [Gn].
Thus, ϕn is forceably necessary over Vδ[Gn]. In this case, the stage n forcing Qn forced it to
be necessary, so ϕ holds in Vδ[Gn+1] and all its forcing extensions. By elementarity again, ϕ
holds in V [Gn+1] and all forcing extensions. In particular, since V [G] is a forcing extension
of V [Gn+1], it holds in V [G] and all further extensions. That is, ϕ is necessary in V [G].
This completes the second proof of Theorem 5.
6Thanks to Ali Enayat for a helpful discussion of these ideas.
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Corollary 6 The theory zfc+mp is equiconsistent with zfc.
Though the hypothesis Vδ ≺ V has now dropped away, there is nevertheless a stronger
connection between zfc+mp and zfc+ Vδ ≺ V than the previous corollary might suggest,
a connection I would like to explore in the next few theorems. One cannot, for example,
omit the hypothesis that Vδ ≺ V from Lemma 5.5.
Theorem 7 If zfc is consistent, then there is a model of zfc having no forcing extension,
and indeed, no extension of any kind with the same ordinals, that is a model of mp. Thus,
one cannot omit the hypothesis that Vδ ≺ V from Lemma 5.5.
Proof: I claim, first, that if there is a model of zfc, then there is one in which the definable
ordinals—and I mean ordinals that are definable without parameters—are unbounded. To
see this, suppose that W is a model of zfc, not necessarily transitive, and let M be the cut
determined by the definable elements of W . That is, M consists of those elements in (Vα)
W ,
where α ranges over the definable ordinals of W . I will show that M ≺W , by verifying the
Tarski-Vaught criterion: suppose W |= ∃xϕ(x, a) for some a ∈ M . By the definition of M ,
it must be that a is in some Vα in the sense of W for some definable ordinal α of W . In W ,
let β be the least ordinal such that for every y ∈ Vα there is an x ∈ Vβ such that ϕ(x, y), if
there is any such x in W at all. Such a β exists by the Replacement Axiom. Moreover, β is
definable in W , and consequently, (Vβ)
W is included in M , and so M has all the witnesses it
needs to verify the Tarski-Vaught criterion. Thus, M ≺W , and in particular, M is a model
of zfc whose definable elements are unbounded. By beginning with a model W that also
satisfies V = L, we may assume additionally that M satisfies V = L as well.
Suppose now, towards contradiction, thatM has an extension N , with the same ordinals
as M , that satisfies zfc + mp. Necessarily, M = (L)N . Consider any definable ordinal α
of W , defined by the formula ψ. Since M ≺ W , the formula ψ also defines α in M , and
since M is the L of N , we know further that α is definable in N as “the ordinal satisfying
ψ in L”. Let ϕ be the sentence expressing, “the ordinal defined by ψ in L is countable”.
This sentence is forceably necessary over N , since if α is not countable in N , one can force
to make it countable, and having done this, of course, it remains countable in any further
extension. Thus, by mp, the sentence ϕ must be already true in N , and so α is countable in
N .
The key observation is now that since the definable ordinals α of M were unbounded in
M , it must be that every ordinal of M is countable in N , a contradiction, since these two
models of zfc have the same ordinals.
While Lemma 5.4 establishes the equiconsistency of zfc with zfc + Vδ ≺ V , when it
comes to transitive models the two theories have different strengths. Specifically, if M is
an ω-model of Vδ ≺ V , then M has the correct internal zfc, and so since every axiom of
zfc is true in Vδ, the model M agrees that Vδ is a model of zfc. Consequently, inside any
∈-minimal transitive model of zfc + Vδ ≺ V there is a transitive model of zfc but, by
minimality, no transitive model of zfc + Vδ ≺ V . So it is relatively consistent that there
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is a transitive model of the one theory, but not the other. In this sense, we might say that
the theory zfc+ Vδ ≺ V has a greater transitive-model consistency strength than zfc. The
next theorem shows that the transitive-model consistency strength of zfc+mp is similarly
greater than zfc, since in fact it is the same as zfc+ Vδ ≺ V .
Theorem 8 The theories zfc+mp and zfc+Vδ ≺ V are transitive-model-equiconsistent in
the sense that one of them has a transitive model if and only if the other also does. Indeed,
for any transitive model of one of these theories, there is a model of the other with the same
ordinals.
Proof: Lemma 5.5 shows that every model of zfc+ Vδ ≺ V has a forcing extension that is
a model of zfc +mp.
Conversely, suppose thatM is a transitive model of zfc+mp. Consider the L ofM , which
must have the form Lγ , for γ = ord
M . The arguments of the previous theorem establish
that every ordinal that is definable in LM is countable in M . Let δ be the supremum of such
ordinals. Thus, δ is at most ωM1 , and in particular, δ < γ. The initial claim of the previous
theorem establishes that in the model LM , the cut determined by the definable ordinals is
an elementary substructure. In this case, this means that Vδ ≺ V in L
M , as desired.
The argument establishes that for an arbitrary order-type ξ (not necessarily well-ordered),
the ξ-consistency strength of zfc + Vδ ≺ V is at least as great as that of zfc + mp, since
from every model of the former theory we can build a model of the latter theory with the
same ordinals. The argument, however, does not quite establish the converse, because in the
non-transitive case one doesn’t seem to know that the supremum of the definable ordinals
of LM exists as an ordinal of M .
In the proof of Lemma 5.5, the forcing P may have size δ, and in this case it may happen
that every cardinal below δ may be collapsed to ω, so there is little reason to expect that
the axiom Vδ ≺ V remains true in the forcing extension V [G] (that is, using (V [G])δ and
V [G]). By taking a little care, however, the following theorem explains how to arrange
zfc+mp+ Vδ ≺ V in the extension.
Theorem 9 If zfc is consistent, then so is the theory zfc+mp+ Vδ ≺ V .
Proof: First, one shows that if there is a model of zfc, then there is a model of zfc +
Vδ ≺ V +cof(δ) is uncountable. This can be proved in the same way as Lemma 5.4, by simply
adding the assertion “cof(δ) > ω” to the theory. The Le´vy Reflection Theorem shows that
any finite collection of formulas is absolute from V to Vδ for a closed unbounded class of
cardinals, and so one may find such a δ of uncountable cofinality.
Given a model of zfc + Vδ ≺ V in which cof(δ) is uncountable, one now proceeds with
the argument of Lemma 5.5, using finite support in the iteration P of that theorem. Since
on cofinality grounds P has size less than δ, it follows that Vδ[G] ≺ V [G] in that argument.
That is, the axiom “Vδ ≺ V ” remains true in V [G], together with zfc+mp.
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3 Consistency of the Maximality Principle mp∼
Let me now turn to the boldface Maximality Principle mp∼ , in which arbitrary real parameters
are allowed to appear in the formulas ϕ of the scheme ✸ ϕ =⇒ ϕ. As one might expect,
the boldface principle mp∼ turns out to have a stronger consistency strength.
Define the expression “ord is Mahlo” to be the scheme asserting that any closed un-
bounded class C ⊆ ord that is definable from parameters contains a regular cardinal. This
is also sometimes referred to as the Le´vy Scheme (e.g., see [5]). Whenever κ is a Mahlo
cardinal, then Vκ |= zfc + ord is Mahlo; so the consistency strength of “ord is Mahlo”
is strictly less than the existence of a Mahlo cardinal. The converse of this implication,
however, is not generally true, because if κ is a Mahlo cardinal, then there is a club C ⊆ κ
consisting of δ with Vδ ≺ V . These Vδ will therefore also model “zfc+ ord is Mahlo”, and
so there will be many non-Mahlo cardinals with that property.
Theorem 10 The following theories are equiconsistent:
1. zfc plus the Maximality Principle mp∼ .
2. zfc plus Vδ ≺ V for an inaccessible cardinal δ.
3. zfc plus ord is Mahlo.
Proof: I will prove the theorem with a sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 10.1 Every model of theory 1 has an inner model of theory 2. Specifically, if mp∼
holds, then δ = ω1 is inaccessible in L, and Lδ ≺ L.
Proof: Assume mp∼ and let δ = ω1. I claim, first, that δ is inaccessible to reals. To see this,
suppose x is a real, and let ϕ be the statement “the ω1 of L[x] is countable”. Since this is
forceably necessary, by mp∼ it is true. Thus, ω
L[x]
1 < δ, as I claimed. It follows from this that
δ is inaccessible in L.
Second, I claim that Lδ is an elementary substructure of L (note: I prove this part of the
Lemma only as a scheme). To see this, simply verify the Tarski-Vaught criterion: suppose
that L satisfies ∃y ψ(a, y) for a set a in Lδ. Let α be least such that there is such a y in Lα.
Consider the statement ϕ asserting “the least α, such that there is a y in Lα with ψ(a, y)
L,
is countable”. This is expressed using the parameter a, which is coded with a real. Since it
is forceably necessary, it must be true by mp∼ , and so α is countable. Thus, y can be found
in Lδ, and so the Tarski-Vaught criterion holds. In summary, L satisfies theory 2.
Lemma 10.2 If theory 2 holds, then theory 1 holds in a forcing extension. Indeed, if Vδ ≺ V
and δ is an inaccessible cardinal, then after the Le´vy collapse making δ the ω1 of the extension,
the Maximality Principle mp∼ holds.
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Proof: Assume that Vδ ≺ V and δ is inaccessible. In order to obtain mp∼ in a forcing
extension, I will define a certain finite support δ-iteration P which at every stage forces with
some poset of rank less than δ. Let 〈ϕα | α < δ 〉 enumerate, with unbounded repetition,
all possible sentences in the forcing language for initial segments of such iterations with
parameters having names in Vδ. Suppose now that the iteration Pα is defined up to stage α;
I would like to define the stage α forcing Q˙α. If ϕα is a sentence with parameters naming
objects in V Pαδ , and if it is possible to force over V
Pα
δ so as to make ϕα necessary, then choose
Q˙α ∈ Vδ to be (the name of) a poset accomplishing this. Otherwise, let Q˙α be trivial forcing.
This defines the δ-iteration P.
Suppose that G ⊆ P is V -generic, and consider the model V [G]. First observe that
the cardinal δ is not collapsed by this forcing, since it is a finite support iteration of δ-c.c.
forcing. Consequently, every real in V [G] appears in some V [Gα]. Thus, if ϕ is a sentence
with (names for) real parameters from V [G], it must be ϕα for some α, with the names in ϕ
coming from V [Gα]. So it suffices to consider the formulas ϕα.
Suppose that such a ϕα is forceably necessary over V [G]. Then it is also forceably
necessary over V [Gα], since V [G] is a forcing extension of V [Gα]. Hence, by the elementarity
Vδ[Gα] ≺ V [Gα] (as in Lemma 5.5), the sentence ϕα is forceably necessary over Vδ[Gα]. The
stage α forcing Qα must then have forced it to be necessary, and so ϕα became necessary in
Vδ[Gα+1], and hence also in V [Gα+1]. Thus, since V [G] is obtained by further forcing over
this model, ϕα remains necessary in V [G]. So V [G] satisfies mp∼ .
Finally, let me consider the precise nature of the iteration P; in fact, we know P very well.
Since the assertion “a is countable” is always forceably necessary, it follows that every element
a ∈ Vδ is countable in V [G]. That is, unboundedly often, the forcing Q˙α collapses elements
of Vδ. Since δ itself is not collapsed, it becomes the ω1 of V [G]. But up to isomorphism, the
only finite support δ-iteration of forcing notions of size less than δ that collapses all cardinals
below δ to ω is the Le´vy collapse of δ to ω1. Thus, P is isomorphic to the Le´vy collapse, as
I claimed.
David Aspero´ has used a similar iteration to prove a similar conclusion relating to his
generalized bounded forcing axioms (see Theorem 3.7 in [1]).
Lemma 10.3 Theory 2 implies theory 3.
Proof: Suppose that Vδ ≺ V and δ is inaccessible. If C ⊆ ord is a definable club, then
of course C ∩ δ is unbounded in δ. Thus, δ ∈ C, and so C contains a regular cardinal, as
desired.
Lemma 10.4 If theory 3 is consistent, then so is theory 2.
Proof: This argument is similar to Lemma 5.4. Suppose that M is a model of zfc plus the
scheme asserting that ord is Mahlo. By the Le´vy Reflection Theorem, any finite collection
of formulas reflects from V to Vθ for a closed unbounded class of cardinals θ. Thus, since ord
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is Mahlo in M , we can find in M a regular cardinal δ such that the formulas are absolute
between V and Vδ in M . We may assume that the finite collection of formulas includes the
assertion that for every β, the cardinal 2β exists, and from this it follows that δ is a strong
limit cardinal. Thus, δ is actually inaccessible in M . So every finite subcollection of theory
2 is consistent, and so the entire theory is consistent.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Lemmas 10.1 and 10.2 establish that if there is a model of one of the two theories
“zfc + mp∼ ” or “zfc + Vδ ≺ V + δ is inaccessible,” then there is a model of the other with
the same ordinals. Therefore, we may conclude:
Corollary 11 The theories “zfc + mp∼ ” and “zfc + Vδ ≺ V + δ is inaccessible” are ξ-
equiconsistent for every order type ξ.
Since Lemma 10.2 proceeds via the Le´vy collapse, one naturally obtains the ch in the
extension, and this leads one to wonder whether mp∼ +¬ch is consistent. The corresponding
question does not arise with the lightface Maximality Principle mp because once mp is true,
it persists to all forcing extensions, and so one can simply force ch or ¬ch as desired, while
preserving mp. But with the boldface Maximality Principle, it is not clear that mp∼ persists
to an extension where new real parameters are available. The following theorem shows how
to sidestep this worry.
Theorem 12 The boldface Maximality Principle mp∼ is relatively consistent with either ch
or ¬ch.
Proof: Over any model one can force ch without adding reals, and this will preserve mp∼ .
Alternatively, the model of Lemma 10.2 satisfies mp∼ + ch, since it is obtained via the Le´vy
collapse of an inaccessible cardinal.
To obtain a model of mp∼ + ¬ch, we will simply add Cohen reals over this model.
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Specifically, I claim that the model V [G][g], where G ⊆ P is V -generic for the iteration of
Lemma 10.2 and g is V [G]-generic for the forcing to add at least ω
V [G]
2 many Cohen reals, is a
model of mp∼ +¬ch. Certainly ¬ch is no problem, so consider mp∼ . The instances of the axiom
scheme ✸ ϕ =⇒ ϕ, where ϕ has real parameters from V [G], hold in V [G] by Lemma
10.2, and each of these instances persists to every forcing extension, including V [G][g]. At
issue is whether the scheme holds of formulas using the new parameters available in V [G][g].
Consider, therefore, a real x in V [G][g] and the corresponding extension V [G][x]. Since x is
added by a countable forcing notion Q, we may reorganize this forcing as V [G][x] = V [x][G′],
where x is now V -generic for some countable forcing notion and G′ is V [x]-generic for the
Le´vy collapse of κ in V [x] (this is because the quotient forcing (P ∗Q)/x has size κ, is κ-c.c.
and collapses every cardinal below κ to ω; hence it is the Le´vy collapse). Since Vκ[x] ≺ V [x],
it follows by Lemma 10.2 that mp∼ holds in V [x][G
′]. Thus, instances of the mp∼ scheme using
7I am grateful to Ilijas Farah for pointing out the applicability of Solovay’s technique here.
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the parameter x hold in V [x][G′] = V [G][x]. Since these persist to any forcing extension,
they also hold in V [G][g]. So mp∼ holds in V [G][g], as desired.
Techniques of Kunen, employing the same reorganization idea as above, can be used to
obtain a model of mp∼ + ¬ch+ma.
Let me close this section with a discussion of the relative consistency of mp with large
cardinals.
Theorem 13 The Maximality Principles mp and mp∼ are consistent with the existence of
inaccessible cardinals, measurable cardinals, supercompact cardinals, or what have you, as-
suming the consistency of a proper class of such cardinals initially (plus, for mp∼ , that ord is
Mahlo). On the other hand, the Maximality Principle is also consistent with the nonexistence
of such cardinals, assuming only the consistency of zfc.
Proof: Suppose that zfc is consistent with the existence of a proper class of, for example,
measurable cardinals. The argument of Lemma 5.4 produces a model of zfc+Vδ ≺ V with a
proper class of measurable cardinals. Since the forcing of Lemma 5.5 has size at most δ, the
measurable cardinals above δ survive to the forcing extension in which mp holds. For mp∼ ,
one should add the hypothesis that “ord is Mahlo” to this argument in order to get a model
as above for which δ is inaccessible, and then carry on as in Theorem 10. This procedure
shows that any large cardinal that is not destroyed by small forcing will be consistent with
mp or mp∼ .
To obtain the Maximality Principle in the absence of all large cardinals, one should simply
apply the argument of Theorem 5 using a model with no inaccessible cardinals. That is, if
M is any model of zfc with no inaccessible cardinals, then no forcing extension of M will
have inaccessible cardinals, and so the assertion that there are no inaccessible cardinals will
be necessary in M and hence in the theory T of that proof.
The attentive reader will observe that in order to deduce the consistency of the Maxi-
mality Principle with an inaccessible cardinal, the previous proof begins with and eventually
produces models with proper classes of such cardinals. This apparent inefficiency suggests
the question of whether the Maximality Principles are consistent with the existence of a
single inaccessible cardinal. The answer, perhaps surprising at first, is that they are not.
Theorem 14 If the Maximality Principle mp holds, then there are a proper class of inac-
cessible cardinals, if any.8
Proof: Suppose that the Maximality Principle holds, but that the inaccessible cardinals
are bounded. Then the assertion “there are no inaccessible cardinals” is forceably necessary,
because one could force, in a permanent way, to make all the inaccessible cardinals countable.
Thus, under mp, there must have been no inaccessible cardinals to begin with.
8Chalons [3] uses a similar idea when proving that the Chalons Maximality Principle does not follow from
any large cardinal axiom.
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The same argument works with any other large cardinal whose existence is downward
absolute from a forcing extension, such as Mahlo cardinals. For measurable cardinals, whose
existence is not downward absolute in this way, the situation is slightly more complicated.
But one can define that a cardinal κ is potentially measurable when it is measurable in a
forcing extension. This notion, of course, is downward absolute from any forcing extension.
Consequently, if mp holds and there is a potentially measurable cardinal, then there must
be a proper class of potentially measurable cardinals. (If there are a bounded number, then
force to collapse them all, making none, in a permanent way; so there must have been none
to begin with.) An identical fact holds for potentially supercompact cardinals, or what have
you.
4 The Necessary Maximality Principle
We turn now to the strongest principle I have mentioned in this paper, the Necessary Max-
imality Principle mp∼ . I will begin with a theorem hinting at surprising strength.
Theorem 15 If mp∼ holds, then 0
# exists.
Proof: It suffices, by the Covering Lemma of Jensen, to find a violation of covering. For
this, it suffices to show that L fails to compute the successors of singular cardinals correctly.
In fact, I will show that L fails to compute the successor of any cardinal correctly. Consider
any cardinal κ and its successors (κ+)L and (κ+)V in the two models. Let g be V -generic for
the canonical forcing that collapses κ to ω. This forcing is the same in V or L and has size κ
in either model, and so by the chain condition it preserves κ+ over either model, making it
the ω1 of the extension. The key observation now is that the sentence ϕ, asserting “(ω1)
L[g]
is countable,” is forceably necessary. Thus, by mp∼ in V [g], this sentence is true in V [g].
Putting these conclusions together, we have
(κ+)L = (ω1)
L[g] < (ω1)
V [g] = (κ+)V ,
and so L does not compute the successor of κ correctly.
This argument generalizes to the following, where by Wγ I mean (Vγ)
W .
Theorem 16 Suppose that mp∼ holds and W is a definable transitive class, invariant under
set forcing. Then:
1. The class W does not compute successor cardinals correctly.
2. Indeed, every regular cardinal is inaccessible in W .
3. Indeed, every cardinal is a limit of inaccessible cardinals in W .
4. For every cardinal γ, Wγ ≺ W .
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5. For every cardinal γ, H(γ)W ≺W .
6. For every cardinal γ, if a set x is definable in W from an object a ∈ H(γ)V , then
x ∈ H(γ)V .
Proof: Clearly, statement 1 of the theorem is implied by statement 2, which is in turn
implied by statement 3. Let me argue that statement 3 is implied by statement 4. If
Wγ ≺W , then clearly γ is a strong limit in W , and hence, if regular, γ is inaccessible in W .
Thus, the inaccessible cardinals are unbounded in W , and hence also in Wγ, so statement
3 holds. Statement 4 easily follows from statement 5, because if H(γ)W ≺ W , then H(γ)W
has the correct (Vα)
W for α < γ, and so H(γ)W = Wγ, giving statement 4.
Next, let me show that statement 5 follows from statement 6, by verifying the Tarski-
Vaught criterion. Suppose thatW satisfies ∃xψ(x, a) where a ∈ H(γ)W . The least hereditary
size in W of such an x is definable in W from a, and so by statement 6 this size must be less
than γ. In particular, there will be such an x in H(γ)W , and so the criterion is fulfilled.
It remains only to prove statement 6 of the theorem. Suppose that x is definable in W
from the object a ∈ H(γ). Let β < γ be the hereditary size of a, so that a ∈ H(β+), and
suppose that g ⊆ β is V -generic for the canonical forcing that collapses β to ω. Let ϕ be the
sentence asserting “x is hereditarily countable”, using the definition of x in W from a, coded
with the real g. Thus, ϕ is a sentence with real parameters, and it is forceably necessary
(please note that I am using here the invariance of W under under set forcing in order to
know that x is still defined in the same way in any forcing extension). Consequently, since
mp∼ implies mp∼ in V [g], the sentence ϕ must be true in V [g]. That is, x is hereditarily
countable in V [g]. Since β+ and γ are preserved to V [g], it follows that x has hereditary size
less than γ in V , as desired. So the proof is complete.
The theorem is easily modified to handle the situation when W is defined from param-
eters. Indeed, if W is definable from a real parameter, the previous proof goes through
essentially unchanged. More generally, we have:
Corollary 17 Suppose that mp∼ holds and W is a transitive class, definable from parame-
ters ~p ∈ H(η+), which is invariant under set forcing. Then the conclusions of the previous
theorem hold above η.
Proof: By this, I mean that such a class W will not compute successor cardinals above η
correctly, that every cardinal above η will be a limit of inaccessible cardinals in W , and so
on, and that every set x definable in W from an object in H(γ) for some γ above η will be
in H(γ).
Suppose, therefore, that W is definable from the parameters ~p ∈ H(η+), and that it is
invariant by set forcing. In the forcing extension V [g] that collapses η to ω, the parameters
~p become hereditarily countable, and the class W therefore becomes definable from a real
z. Thus, applying the previous proof to the class W , defined by the real z in V [g], the
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conclusion follows for the cardinals of V [g]. Since these are precisely the cardinals above η
in V , the corollary is proved.
Corollary 18 If mp∼ holds, then for every set x, the set x
# exists. That is, the universe
is closed under sharps.
Proof: Fix any set x, and let g be a real collapsing cardinals so that x can be coded by
a real x¯ in V [g]. Let W = L[x]. This is definable from x¯, and is invariant in any further
extension of V [g]. Thus, by the previous corollary, if mp∼ holds, then L[x] does not compute
the successors of singular cardinals above x correctly. It follows that x# exists in V [g], and
so it also exists in V .
The same idea shows that the universe is closed under daggers and pistols. Any model of
the form L[x, µ], for example, where the measure µ lives on the smallest possible ordinal, is
definable from x, and Theorem 16 shows that this model cannot compute successor cardinals
correctly above x.
Projective Absoluteness Theorem 19 The Necessary Maximality Principle mp∼ im-
plies Projective Absoluteness. That is, if mp∼ holds, then projective truth is invariant by
set forcing; every Σ1n formula is absolute to any set forcing extension.
Proof: Assume mp∼ . I will show, by induction on n, that every Σ
1
n formula ϕ is absolute to
any set forcing extension. This is trivial for n = 0 (and indeed, it holds automatically up to
Σ12 by the Shoenfield Absoluteness Theorem). Assume by induction that it is true for all Σ
1
n
formulas. Further, since mp∼ holds in all set forcing extensions, suppose that this induction
hypothesis also holds in all set forcing extensions, that is, that the Σ1n formulas are absolute
from any set forcing extension to any further set forcing extension. Since the collection
of ϕ for which this hypothesis is true is clearly preserved under Boolean combinations, it
suffices to consider an existential formula ψ(x) = ∃y ϕ(x, y), where ϕ is absolute from any
forcing extension to any further forcing extension. If ψ(a) is true in such a model, then since
ϕ is absolute to any set forcing extension and both a and the witness y still exist there,
ψ(a) remains true in any set forcing extension. Conversely, suppose that ψ(a) is true in a
set forcing extension V P, with a ∈ V . Thus, the witness y to ϕ was added by the forcing
P. Since by the induction hypothesis the formula ϕ(a, y) is absolute to any further forcing
extension, the formula ψ(a) is necessary in V P and therefore forceably necessary in V . Thus,
by mp∼ , it is already true in V , as desired. So every projective formula is absolute by set
forcing, and the theorem is proved.
Corollary 20 The consistency of mp∼ implies that of the existence of infinitely many strong
cardinals.
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Proof: Kai Hauser [4] has shown that projective absoluteness is equiconsistent with the
existence of infinitely many strong cardinals.
The next theorem hints at an even stronger strength for mp∼ , assuming that ord is
ineffible, i.e., the scheme asserting that for every class partition F : [ord]2 → 2 there is a
homogeneous stationary class H ⊆ ord. This axiom is naturally expressed in Go¨del-Bernays
set theory, using class quantifiers. I am indebted to Philip Welch for his helpful remarks
concerning the next few corollaries.
Corollary 21 If mp∼ holds and ord is ineffable, then there is an inner model of a Woodin
cardinal.
Proof: Steel [7] has proved that if there is no inner model of a Woodin cardinal and if
the universe is closed under sharps and ord is ineffable, then there is a definable class K,
now widely known as the Mitchell-Steel core model, which is invariant under set forcing and
which computes the successors of singular cardinals correctly. Since Theorem 16 shows that
if mp∼ holds, then the universe is closed under sharps but there can be no such class K, it
follows under the hypothesis that there must be an inner model with a Woodin cardinal.
One can modify the assumption that ord is ineffable by building the core model up to
a weakly compact cardinal κ. Specifically, Steel [7] shows that if κ is weakly compact, Vκ is
closed under sharps and Vκ has no inner model of a Woodin cardinal, then the core model
K built up to κ will compute the successors of singular cardinals correctly. Thus, since mp∼
implies closure under sharps and refutes the possibility of such a class K, this establishes:
Corollary 22 If κ is weakly compact and Vκ |= mp∼ , then Vκ has an inner model of a
Woodin cardinal.
This kind of analysis can be lifted to those core models with more Woodin cardinals, provided
that Weak Covering holds. Following this line, Philip Welch has announced the following:
Theorem 23 (Welch) If mp∼ , then Projective Determinacy pd holds.
Welch also conjectured that if mp∼ holds and there is an inaccessible cardinal, then ad
L(R).
Woodin has announced, in conversation, that mp∼ implies ad
L(R) outright.
I regret that the obvious problem remains unsolved:
Challenge Problem 24 Is zfc+ mp∼ (relatively) consistent?
I would welcome a consistency proof relative to any large cardinal hypothesis.
Let me present a theorem, suggested by W. Hugh Woodin, that makes at least some
progress in this direction. Let’s say that a sentence is local if it can be expressed in the form
“ψ holds in Vκ, where κ is the least inaccessible cardinal”. Such sentences assert a truth that
can be checked locally, in this Vκ, without need to consult the entirety of V . This is a broad
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class of assertions, including all the conjectures and theorems of classical mathematics, as
well as the bulk of contemporary mathematics.
Please note that the least inaccessible cardinal, of course, is not invariant by forcing; a
model may disagree with a forcing extension on the particular value of κ even when the two
models agree about some particular local assertion.
Theorem 25 If there are a proper class of Woodin cardinals, then the Necessary Maximality
Principle mp∼ holds for local assertions (using real parameters in any forcing extension).
Proof: I will first prove that if there are a proper class of Woodin cardinals, then the
Maximality Principle mp∼ holds for local assertions using real parameters in the ground
model. From this, since the hypothesis of a proper class of Woodin cardinals is preserved by
set forcing, it follows that the same conclusion holds in every forcing extension as well. That
is, from the hypothesis of a proper class of Woodin cardinals one can conclude the Necessary
Maximality Principle mp∼ for local assertions as well.
To begin, then, suppose that ϕ is local and forceably necessary, forced necessary by the
forcing P, with real parameters in V . Choose a Woodin cardinal δ above the rank of P
and let P<δ be the stationary tower forcing corresponding to δ. Suppose that G<δ ⊆ P<δ
is V -generic below a condition forcing that 2|P| becomes countable. By the basic properties
of stationary tower forcing (see, e.g. [8], [9]), there is a generic elementary embedding
j : V → M ⊆ V [G<δ], with M
<δ ⊆ M in V [G<δ]. The model M therefore agrees with
V [G<δ] well beyond the first inaccessible cardinal. Since furthermore 2
|P| was collapsed, in
V [G<δ] we may construct a V -generic filter for P, and therefore we may view V [G<δ] as a
forcing extension of V P. Since ϕ is made necessary in V P, it follows that ϕ holds in V [G<δ].
Thus, since V [G<δ] agrees with M well beyond the first inaccessible cardinal, ϕ holds also
in M . Finally, since the real parameters of ϕ are fixed by j, it follows by elementarity that
ϕ holds also in V , as desired.
In the previous argument, one can clearly relax the notion of “local” assertions quite a
bit. Rather than using the least inaccessible cardinal, for example, one could use the least
Mahlo cardinal or the second measurable cardinal or the fifth measurable limit of measurable
cardinals, and so on. All that is required in the argument is that the cardinal in question be
less than or equal to the Woodin cardinal δ used in the proof, and that the cardinal be the
same in M and V [Gδ].
Finally, there is a seeming affinity between the Maximality Principles and the possibility
that the theory of L(R) is persistent, that is, that it is invariant by set forcing, as it is if
there are sufficiently many Woodin cardinals. But what is the exact connection between
these notions?
Question 26 What is the relationship between mp∼ and the Th(L(R)) being invariant by
forcing?
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5 Modified Maximality Principles
The Maximality Principle admits numerous modified forms, obtained by restricting the kinds
of forcing extensions allowed in the modal quantifiers. Specifically, suppose that P is a
definable class of forcing notions; we may define that a statement ϕ is possible or forceable
by forcing notions in P, written ✸P ϕ, when it holds in a forcing extension V
P by a forcing
notion in P. Similarly, ϕ is necessary or persistent by forcing notions in P, written P ϕ,
when ϕ holds in V and all extension V P by forcing P ∈ P. Combining the two notions, we
see that ϕ is forceably necessary by forcing notions in P, written ✸P P ϕ, when it holds in
some extension V P and all subsequent extensions V P∗Q˙, where P and Q˙ are taken from P
(interpreting P, in the case of Q˙, in the model V P).
The Maximality Principle can now be stated in the restricted form as follows:
Maximality Principle (mpP) If a statement is forceably necessary by forcing notions in
P, then it is persistent by forcing in P.
Natural instances of this principle include:
• (mpcard) Any statement forceably necessary by forcing that preserves cardinals is per-
sistent by such forcing.
• (mpω1) Any statement forceably necessary by forcing that preserves ω1 is persistent by
such forcing.
• (mpccc) Any statement forceably necessary by c.c.c. forcing is persistent by c.c.c. forc-
ing.
• (mpproper) Any statement forceably necessary by proper forcing is persistent by such
forcing.
• (mpsemi−proper) Any statement forceably necessary by semi-proper forcing is persistent
by such forcing.
• (mpch) Any statement forceably necessary by forcing preserving ch is persistent by
such forcing.
And so on. All these principles admit the equivalent forms of Theorem 1, so that mpch, for
example, is equivalent to the assertion that every true sentence is forceable by ch-preserving
forcing over every forcing extension with ch.
But are they consistent? One might initially think, since these principles simply restrict
the class of forcing notions in the Maximality Principle, that they are special cases of or at
least follow immediately from the full Maximality Principle mp. But this is not correct. For
the reader will readily realize that an assertion may be forceably necessary by c.c.c. forcing,
for example, but not be forceably necessary at all (e.g. ¬ch). An assertion can be persistent
under c.c.c. forcing, but not under all forcing.
So it is not immediately clear that these modified Maximality Principles are consistent.
I will prove now that at least some of them are.
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Theorem 27 Suppose that P is necessarily closed under finite support or countable support
iterations of countable length. Assuming Vδ ≺ V , then, there is a forcing extension obtained
by forcing with a notion in P in which mpP holds.
Proof: In the proof of Lemma 5.5, let us simply ensure that the forcing Qn at stage n comes
from P. Then, define P to be the finite support or countable support iteration of the Qn,
depending on the closure of P. Having done so, the iteration P, as well as the tail forcing
Ptail, will be in P, and so the argument of Lemma 5.5 works to establish mpP in V
P.
Corollary 28 The principles mpccc, mpproper and mpsemi−proper are equiconsistent with zfc.
Theorem 29 Assume that zfc is consistent. If in any model of set theory, the class P is
closed under finite iterations and members of P are necessarily in P, then zfc + mpP is
consistent.
Proof: This argument follows the first proof of Theorem 5. Suppose thatM is any model of
zfc, and let T be the collection of sentences that are forceably necessary over M , referring
throughout this argument only to forcing notions in P.
I claim first that the theory T is consistent. Given any finite subcollection ϕ1, . . . , ϕn,
with ϕi forced necessary by Pi, consider P = P1×· · ·×Pn. By the hypotheses of the theorem,
this is in P. Further, the extension MP is a forcing extension of each MPi , by forcing in P
there. Thus, the extension MP satisfies each ϕi, and so this collection is consistent.
Next, I claim that T is absolute to all forcing extensions of M . If a sentence is forceably
necessary over M with respect to forcing in P, then the forcing that made it necessary will
still be in P in any forcing extension, and serve to make it necessary there. So it will be
forceably necessary over any forcing extension also. Conversely, if a sentence is forceably
necessary over a forcing extension ofM by forcing in P, then clearly it is forceably necessary
in M .
Finally, I claim that any model N of T is a model of zfc + mpP . Certainly zfc ⊆ T
since these are necessary over M . If ϕ is forceably necessary over N , then ϕ must be in T ,
for if not, then the assertion that ϕ is not forceably necessary would be necessary and hence
in T , a contradiction. Thus, ϕ ∈ T and so ϕ holds in N , as desired.
Define that a poset is necessarily-c.c.c. if it is c.c.c. in every c.c.c. forcing extension. For
example, while Souslin trees lose their c.c.c. property after forcing with them, the forcing
to add (any number of) Cohen reals does not. Let mp ccc be the corresponding Maximality
Principle for such forcing notions. Similarly, define that P is necessarily ω1-preserving if it
preserves ω1 over every forcing extension with the correct ω1, and denote the corresponding
Maximality Principle by mp ω1 .
Corollary 30 The principles mp ccc and mp ω1 are equiconsistent with zfc.
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Proof: The corresponding classes of posets have the closure properties of the theorem.
Let me turn now to boldface versions of the modified principles. The intriguing possibility
here is the potential to go beyond the reals by including some uncountable parameters in
the scheme. In Observation 3, the argument that excluded uncountable parameters, we used
forcing that collapsed cardinals. So when restricting to a class of posets that preserve all
cardinals, such as the c.c.c. posets, we might hope to include many more parameters.
But unfortunately, we cannot hope to use any set as a parameter. In the c.c.c. case, for
example, suppose that A is the set of reals of a model M . The assertion, “there is a real
x /∈ A,” is forceably necessary by c.c.c. forcing over M , because one can simply add a Cohen
real, but it is not true in M by the very definition of A. More generally, if A is any set in M
having hereditary size at least 2ω, then the assertion, “2ω is greater than the hereditary size
of A,” is forceably necessary by c.c.c. forcing, since one may make 2ω as large as desired,
but again, it is not true in M .
This argument suggests that we must at least restrict our parameter space to H(2ω),
those parameters of hereditary size less than 2ω. And the following theorem shows that
restricting this far is enough.
Theorem 31 The following theories are equiconsistent.
1. zfc+mp∼ ccc, allowing arbitrary parameters from H(2
ω), plus 2ω is weakly inaccessible.
2. zfc+mp∼ ccc, allowing ordinal parameters below 2
ω, plus 2ω is regular.
3. zfc+ Vδ ≺ V + δ is inaccessible.
4. zfc+mp∼ .
Proof: Clearly, the first theory directly implies the second theory. Furthermore, I have
already shown that the third and fourth theories are equiconsistent.
Lemma 31.1 Every model of theory 2 contains an inner model of theory 3.
This Lemma is a consequence of the following Lemma:
Lemma 31.2 If mp∼ ccc holds (in the language with ordinal parameters below 2
ω) and δ = 2ω
is regular, then δ is inaccessible in L and Lδ ≺ L.
Proof: Suppose that the Maximality Principle mp∼ ccc holds for c.c.c. forcing in the language
with ordinal parameters below δ = 2ω, and that δ is regular. Note that for any γ < δ, the
assertion “2ω > γ+” is forceably necessary, since by c.c.c. forcing, one can pump up 2ω as
large as desired. Thus, this assertion must be true, and so δ is weakly inaccessible and hence
inaccessible in L.
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To prove Lδ ≺ L, I will simply verify the Tarski-Vaught criterion. Suppose that L |=
∃xψ(x, y) for some y ∈ Lδ. Let β < δ be large enough so that y ∈ Lβ . Now, by the
Replacement Axiom, let α be least so that for every y′ ∈ Lβ with an x satisfying ψ(x, y),
there is such an x in Lα. This property defines α in any forcing extension, and so the
assertion 2ω > α is forceably necessary. Thus, α < δ, and so the witness x for y can be found
in Lδ, as desired.
Lemma 31.3 Any model of theory 3 has a forcing extension that is a model of theory 1.
Proof: This argument follows Lemma 10.2 above. Suppose that Vδ ≺ V and δ is inaccessible.
Enumerate 〈ϕα | α < δ 〉 all sentences ϕ (with unbounded repetition) in the language of set
theory with (names for) parameters in Vδ coming from a forcing extension by forcing of size
less than δ. Define a finite support δ-iteration of c.c.c. forcing, so that at each stage γ < δ,
the forcing Qα forces ϕα to be necessary over V
Pα
δ , if possible (i.e. first, if this makes sense,
if the parameters appearing in ϕα are Pα-names, and second, if there is such a forcing in
V Pαδ ). Let G ⊆ Pδ be V -generic for Pδ, and consider the model V [G]. Note that periodically
during the iteration, the posets will ensure that 2ω is made arbitrarily large below δ, and so
2ω ≥ δ in V [G]. Conversely, since the forcing has size δ, it is easy to see that V [G] |= 2ω = δ.
Further, since the iteration is c.c.c., δ remains a regular limit cardinal. Finally, if ϕ is a
forceably necessary assertion over V [G] with parameters in H(2ω) = H(δ), then ϕ = ϕα for
some α such that the parameters are Pα-names. Since ϕ was forceably necessary in V [G]
it must have been forceably necessary in V [Gα] and hence, since Vδ[Gα] ≺ V [Gα], it was
forceably necessary in Vδ[Gα]. Thus, it was forced to be necessary in Vδ[Gα+1], and so it was
necessary in V [Gα+1]. Thus, it is true in V [G], as desired. In summary, V [G] |= mp∼ ccc + 2
ω
is weakly inaccessible.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
A nearly identical argument works in the case of proper forcing:
Theorem 32 The following theories are equiconsistent.
1. zfc+mp∼ proper, using parameters in H(2
ω), plus 2ω is weakly inaccessible.
2. zfc+mp∼ ccc, using parameters in H(2
ω), plus 2ω is weakly inaccessible.
3. zfc+mp∼ .
Proof: Using the techniques of 31.2, one can show that if the first theory holds, then δ = 2ω
is inaccessible in L and Lδ ≺ L. And this has already been proved equiconsistent with the
second and third theories.
Conversely, the second and third theories are equiconsistent with zfc + Vδ ≺ V for an
inaccessible cardinal δ. Given this, one enumerates the formulas 〈ϕα | α < δ 〉 using (names
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for) parameters in Vδ appearing in forcing extensions of size less than δ, and then performs a
countable support δ-iteration Pδ of proper forcing, which at stage α < δ forces the necessity
of ϕα over V
Pα
δ by proper forcing, provided that this make sense (that is, the names in ϕα are
Pα-names) and that this is possible (that is, there is a proper forcing poset accomplishing
this). The resulting forcing extension V P will be a model of zfc+mp∼ proper, just as in Lemma
31.3.
And by using revised countable support in the iteration, one can deduce a similar fact
for mp∼ semi−proper, using parameters in H(2
ω).
A natural question remains open here, whether the assertion that 2ω is weakly inaccessible
can be removed from Theorems 31 and 32. The arguments I gave show that mp∼ ccc implies
that 2ω is a limit cardinal. And it is easy to see that it must be a limit cardinal of very
high rank, since with c.c.c. forcing one can push 2ω beyond ℵω1 , ℵℵω1 or any other definable
cardinal. Does mp∼ ccc imply outright that 2
ω is regular? If so, then mp∼ ccc is equiconsistent
with mp∼ . If not, then is mp∼ ccc actually weaker than mp∼ in consistency strength?
Another interesting point is that while the arguments here are based on that of Lemma
10.2, in that earlier lemma we could actually say much more about the nature of the δ-
iteration P, namely, that the forcing P there was necessarily the Le´vy collapse making δ the
ω1 of the extension. In the previous argument and in Lemma 31.3, this is certainly not the
case. But is there, nevertheless, an alternative, simple characterization of the iterations P?
If so, this would be very interesting to know.
There are truly a plethora of open problems remaining here. Apart from the big open
question—the relative consistency of mp∼—one can analyze the various modified maximality
principles, including mpcard, mpω1, mpstat−pres, and so on, along with their boldface and nec-
essary forms (mp∼ card, mp∼ card, etc.). Other interesting principles are obtained by restricting
to forcing extensions that preserve a given statement or theory, such as ch. For example,
mpch is the scheme asserting that every statement that is forceably necessary by forcing
preserving ch is already true. One can also consider forcing notions not adding reals, or
preserving a given supercompact cardinal, and so on. The possibilities seem endless.
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